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PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS:

STRUCTURALISM, LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP, AND THE NEW
HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM
Ronald C. Kahn'

I. INTRODUCTION

Much of legal scholarship on presidential power has been
confined to arguments for and against unitary versus non-unitary
approaches to presidential power. This debate is based upon
scholars' support of originalist or non-originalist interpretations of
the presidential power in the Constitution and/or the practical effects of the unitary and non-unitary presidency on domestic and
foreign policy, presidential power, and contemporary politics. This
Article will review briefly the range of issues of concern to the
most gifted of conventional legal scholars on the presidency and
suggest how Gerhardt, Tulis, and Lowi seek to expand the horizons
of this scholarship by studying a much wider context of political
and legal institutional structure and historical conditions. It concludes with a discussion of how more "external" or "outside" factors than those discussed by Gerhardt, Tulis, and Lowi can be
brought to the study of presidential power through the application
of new historical institutional approaches and insights.

t A.B. 1964, Rutgers University; M.A. 1967, Ph.D. 1973, University of Chicago.
James Monroe Professor of Politics and Law, Oberlin College.
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II. CONVENTIONAL LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP ON PRESIDENTIAL POWER

At the core of much legal scholarship on the presidency and
presidential power is a debate which centers on the degree to
which it should be viewed as unitary. The legalist debate about a
unitary presidency centers on two primary concerns. The first is
whether an originalist interpretation of the Constitution requires a
unitary presidency. Thus the debate about a unitary presidency is
about whether one supports an originalist or non-originalist interpretation of the Constitution and one's approach to separation of
powers. The debate about a unitary presidency also centers on
whether significant changes in American government and institutions, especially the growth of the administrative state in the twentieth century, demand a unitary presidency whether or not an originalist interpretation requires it. Steven Calabresi and Christopher
Yoo identify the following three major debates between unitarians
and anti-unitarians: whether "the text and structure of the Constitution as originally understood created a strongly unitarian executive
branch;" whether "changed circumstances of today make the unitary
executive more necessary now than ever before"; and "whether
normatively a strongly unitary executive is a good thing."' Calabresi and various co-authors support a unitary presidency on all
three counts. They also argue for broad presidential power of removal and control over the execution of law,2 claiming that the
text and structure of the Constitution as originally understood created a strongly unitarian executive branch
Some scholars reject the view that an originalist interpretation
of the Constitution requires a unitary presidency, instead arguing
for a unitary presidency on other grounds. Lawrence Lessig and
Cass Sunstein argue that according to the Calabresi and Rhodes
view "the President must have the authority to control all government officials who implement the laws because the text, structure,
and history of the Constitution . . . plainly require the result."4
1. Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the First
Half-Century, 47 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1451, 1453-55 (1997).
2. See id. at 1453.
3. See id. at 1454; see also Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural
Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary 105 HARV. L. REV. 1553 (1992); Steven
Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23
(1995); Steven Calabresi and Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power To Execute
the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541 (1994).
4. See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration,
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They argue that it is "just [a] plain myth" or "creation" of the
twentieth century to say that the Framers constitutionalized a unitary view of the executive; rather the Framers envisioned "a large
degree of congressional power to structure the administration as it
thought proper."' Lessig and Sunstein argue in favor of a unitary
executive because it promotes "accountability, coordination, and
uniformity in the execution of the laws." 6 They must choose between what they call "a compelling non-historical argument supporting a strong unitary design" and an originalist argument against
a unitary executive. They choose support for a strong unitary executive because changed circumstances since the eighteenth century
require them to "accommodate the framers' design within this
changed constitutional context."7 The rejection of the nondelegation
doctrine by the Supreme Court and the rise of a powerful discretionary administrative state requires that administrators not be "immunized from presidential control" if we are to be "faithful to the
original design."' Lessig and Sunstein's argument for a unitary
executive is based on what they call "a large measure of pragmatic
judgement and historical understanding" not in the "mandates of
history" which all too often are based on "ahistorical claims about
a unitary executive." 9
Steven Calabresi and Saikrishna B. Prakash disagree with
Lessig and Sunstein's approach because it "focuses far too much
on what they think the Framers must have 'imagined,' while overlooking the original meaning of the words of the constitutional text
that the Framers actually wrote."'" Calabresi and Prakash claim
that the Lessig and Sunstein piece is "mythologically flawed" because they give "dispositive weight to an incomplete rendition of
the relaxant history over the legal text itself." In so doing, "Their
arguments against the theory of the unitary executive should fail to
persuade anyone who considers herself an originalist (or a
textualist)."" For Calabresi and Prakash, Lessig and Sunstein fail

94 COLuM. L. REv. 1, 2 (1994).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 3; see also Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and
Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395 (1995) (presenting an interesting argument concerning
changed readings of constitutional text).
8. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 119.
9. Id.
10. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 3, at 546.
11. Id., at 546.
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to place the Article II debate in the relevant pre-1789 history and
the relevant post-ratification history and "they fail to gain the moral force of an originalist argument that overwhelmingly supports a
hierarchical executive branch under the control of the President."' 2
Calabresi and Yoo's contribution for this Symposium continues the argument for a unitary executive through documentation of
development of the unitary executive over the course of the first
fifty years of our constitutional history. They argue that the tradition within the executive branch has always been "overwhelmingly
unitarian" and that "for 208 years Presidents have vigorously
guarded the powers the Framers gave them, even though Congress
and the Supreme Court have not acquiesced in presidential claims
of power over removals and law execution."' 3
The debate between Lessig/Sunstein and Calabresi/Prakash is
really about what constitutes an originalist approach to constitutional interpretation and whether originalism compared to non-originalism and historical practice should be the normative basis for defining and evaluating presidential power. The primary issue in these
important contributions is not whether a unitary executive is best
for the nation. 4
Other papers presented at this Symposium provide additional
insights into the conventional debate between unitary and anti-unitary scholars. Louis Fisher, an anti-unitarian, asks us to reinvigorate
Congress's war powers. He argues that Presidents violate constitutional mandates when they side-step Congress in military operations
and act under the auspices of the United Nations or NATO.' By
side-stepping Congress, Fisher argues that Presidents have diminished, if not extinguished, the role of Congress under its war powers. 6 Peter Shane argues for Congressional involvement in the
most basic policy questions regarding military engagement in order

12. Id., at 549.
13. See Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 1, at 1458.
14. See also Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 3, at 1155 (arguing that theories of
broad congressional powers over federal court jurisdiction strongly suggest limited congressional power to restructure the executive department and that theories of limited congressional jurisdiction-stripping power compel a unitary executive; see also Calabresi, supra
note 3, at 23 (presenting arguments in support of a strong unitary executive, a listing of
threats to the executive by the federal courts, the public interest bar, the Congressional
committee system, and the congressional collective action problem).
15. See Louis Fisher, Sidestepping Congress: Presidents Acting Under the UN and
NATO, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1239, 1240 (1997).
16. See id.
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to counter pathologies created by the realities of executive branch
organization and decision making. Shane concludes that "the War
Powers Resolution was not a failure, but a success," because "the
values of sound military decision making process are well served
by preserving a state of ambiguity as to what the allocation of
military decision-making authority is in all but the easiest cases."' 7
He asks us to consider a new notion of rule of law defined as a
context of bargaining between President and Congress caused in
part by the War Powers Resolution.
Rather than discussing the constitutional legitimacy, necessity,
or normative goodness of a unitary and non-unitary presidency,
anti-unitarian scholar Neal Devins explores the practical and political effects of a presidential line-item veto. He writes, "In the end,
the line item veto is likely to add more nuance than substance to
the elaborate stew of Congressional-White House power-sharing."' 8
For Devins, political will may be as important as structural divisions of authority for understanding why the presidency is not
unitary and for understanding the successes and failures of Presidents who seek control of executive and administrative policymaking. 9 In a similar vein, legalist Michael A. Fitts, a participant
in the Symposium, argues elsewhere:
[S]tructural changes that appear to enhance the power of
the President under public choice approaches and unitary
executive principles can, at the same time, actually undermine the President's reputation, his ability to resolve conflicts, and ultimately, his political strength ....
The individuality, centrality, and visibility of the "personal unitary
presidency," which is seen as an advantage in terms of
collective choice and public debate, can be a disadvantage
when it comes to conflict resolution and public assessment. 0

17. See Peter M. Shane, Learning McNamara's Lessons: How the War Powers
Resolution Advances the Rule of Law, 47 CAsE W. REs. L. REV. 1281, 1286 (1997).
18. Neal E. Devins, In Search of the Lost Chord: Reflections on the 1996 Item Veto
Act, 47 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1605, 1608 (1997); see also Neal Devins, Political Will
and the Unitary Executive: What makes an Independent Agency Independent?, 15
CARDoZO L. REV. 272 (1993) (arguing that congressional grants of the authority to litigate to independent agencies affect White House control over the operations of independent agencies).
19. See Devins, Lost Chord, supra note 18, at 1622.
20. See Michael A. Fitts, The Paradox of Power in the Modern State: Why a Unitary,
Centralized Presidency May Not Exhibit Effective or Legitimate Leadership, U. PA. L.
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Fitts's argument is self-consciously an extension of Theodore
Lowi's argument in The Personal President: Power Invested, Power Unfulfilled, on the political weaknesses and inadequacies of
modem Presidents. Fitts writes:
Extending Lowi's analysis, I argue that while the presidency may have become a more complex and effective
institution bureaucratically and legally, in many ways it has
also become more individualized politically, which can
undermine its political legitimacy and strength. The legal
theory of the unitary executive, for which I am in sympathy, can be at war with itself.2'
Thus, Fitts's primary objective is to "explore how the source of at
least some of our frustration with the office of the presidency is a
result of the structure of the position, rather than the personal
'mistakes' of its inhabitants."' A second purpose is to "suggest
possible legal reforms and tactical approaches modem Presidents
could follow ... to help the chief executive, when appropriate,
mediate conflict and avoid certain types of individualized scrutiny"
in this age of weak political parties.'
I. 'INSIDE' AND 'OUTSIDE'

PERSPECTIVES ON THE PRESIDENCY

Conventional legal scholarship on the presidency and presidential power has centered on issues of originalist and nonoriginalist interpretations of the Constitution, the legitimacy of a
unitary presidency, the necessity and normative goodness of a
unitary or non-unitary presidency today, and whether efforts to
enhance the power of a unitary President have been politically
successful. The contributions of Michael Gerhardt, Jeffrey Tulis,
and Theodore Lowi seek to substantially expand the empirical base
in scholarship on presidential power, while not eschewing important
normative issues that remain central. Most important, these scholars
are concerned about how the broader historical context informs

REv. 827, 835 (1996).
21. Id. at 836.
22. Id. at 837.
& Robert Inman, Controlling Congress: Presidential
23. Id.; see also Michael Fitts
Influence in Domestic Fiscal Policy, 80 GEO. LJ. 1737, 1739 (1992) (arguing that politi-

cal patronage and executive discretion can be important elements of fiscal reform, not
sources of inefficiency in government).
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presidential power and how changes in the structure of the presidency and actions of Presidents may impact changes in political
and legal institutions, the construction of political issues, and the
wider society.24
Michael Gerhardt offers useful initial insights for exploring
new directions in legal scholarship on the presidency and presidential power. Gerhardt notes that two perspectives, which he calls the
"inside" and "outside" perspective, are crucial for explaining and
evaluating presidential performance. The perspective from inside
the process focuses on the President's organization of the process
for making appointments and his interactions with the Senate. The
inside perspective leads one to ask such questions as why or how
particular nominations were made and why certain nominations
succeeded and others failed, to review presidential-senatorial interactions within and among appointments, and to explore the relationship between appointment decisions and other presidential
choices and senatorial activities.'
The perspective from outside the process "examines the external forces (i.e., the social, political, economic, historical developments or influences originating from outside the formal or constitutional structure) pressuring or constraining presidential decisions on
appointments matters. The outside perspective is concerned with the
multi-layered, complex contexts in which presidential appointments
decisions are made."' The outside perspective leads one to ask
how social, political, and economic developments have shaped the
presidency and presidential performance in the appointments process, whether the relevant constitutional structure matters, permits
accountability, produces competent appointments in terms of the fit
between talent, ability, and experience and the particular responsibilities of an offer, and permits capture of the appointments process
by factions. Also, the outside perspective allows one to evaluate
the quality of discourse between the President and the Senate and
whether the President or the Senate wields too much or too little
power on appointment matters. The development of an outside
view of the presidency and presidential power would allow scholars
"to develop standard for evaluating presidential contributions and

24.
ments
25.
26.
27.

See Michael J. Gerhardt, Putting PresidentialPerformance In The Federal AppointProcess In Perspective, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1359, 1359-61 (1997).
See id.
Id. at 1360-61.
See id.
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performances in the appointments process . . . that cut across
different historical periods."' By looking at both internal and external perspectives scholars can "consider the fundamental question
of how Presidents restructure their offices in response to, as well
as in anticipation of, social, economic, political, and other outside
developments or changes.' 29
In the next three sections I will explore the contributions of
Gerhardt, Tulis, and Lowi with regard to how they improve upon
what I consider to be the limited perspectives on presidential power
that are at the core of even the most sophisticated of the conventional approaches to presidential power, as discussed in the first
section. I also will suggest that much more has to be done to
develop what Gerhardt calls the "outside" perspective, particularly
if important insights from new historical institutional approaches to
the relationship of law, political institutions, and social change are
to inform this perspective.
IV. PRESIDENTIAL CHOICES AND EFFECTIVENESS
IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Michael Gerhardt offers the following statement of scholarly
objectives of his project on the appointments process: (1) to define
the relationship between the context in which the appointments
process operates and our understandings of events within that process; (2) to identify the similar patterns and reasons that presidents
and senators have tended to follow and offer in making decisions
within the federal appointments process; (3) to identify advantages
and (generally overlooked) limitations of evaluating and explaining
presidential performance in the appointments process in conventional strictly personal terms; and (4) to understand "presidential performance in the appointments process in institutional terms . . . to
illuminate the various factors cutting across different historical
periods that have facilitated or impeded presidential dominance of
the federal appointments process."3' Gerhardt centers on an inside
view of the process and explores the appointments process so he
can "shed considerable light on their [Senators and Presidents]
respective priorities, temperaments, political skills, allegiances, and

28. Id. at 1372.
29. Gerhardt, supra note 24, at 1361.
30. Id. at 1364.
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personal values."'" Gerhardt seeks to define a broader context in
which to understand and to assess the process by which federal
appointments are made, to tell the rest of the story by constructing
a comprehensive portrait of the operations of the process), and to
"ensure[] a comprehensive understanding and evaluation of presidential performance in the appointments process."32
Gerhardt admits that his objective of establishing an outside
view of presidential power must wait for another day. He notes
that the primary objective of his article is "to sketch the answers to
some of the questions raised by the inside perspective. . . . I hope
to lay some of the groundwork for understanding presidential performance in the federal appointments process, including the significance of the degree to which a President's exercise of his appointment power facilitates his achievement of certain constitutional and
policy objectives."33
Contextual factors that inform presidential power for Gerhardt
include the growth of the national government in the last sixty
years with an accompanying increase in the number of offices that
require need Senate confirmation. This growth adds to presidential
control of administration, but also adds opportunities for Senators
to bargain with the President and increase the number, not the
percentage, of blocked appointments. For example, contextual factors that were central to Lincoln's need to work with Congress to
satisfy Congress's and his interests in the appointment of Justice
Miller were geographic suitability, loyalty to party, and preservation of the Union and Constitution.3 4 In non-judicial appointments
Lincoln followed the rule of expediency, using appointments to
sustain loyalty through patronage or the political control of opponents.35 We also see contextual factors at work in President
Clinton's choices.36 Clinton's substantial legislative agenda meant
that, compared to his predecessors, Clinton could not afford protracted confirmation battles-a contextual factor that increased
senatorial influence and clearance.
Gerhardt also demonstrates how long term concerns, such as a
nominee's political philosophy about the role of national govern-

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 1372.
Id. at 1363.
Id. at 1361-62.
See Gerhardt, supra note 24, at 1366-68.
See id.
See id. at 1385.
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ment in American society and the relationship among the branches,
and short term concerns such as a nominee's political party, chances for confirmation, domicile, age, and supporters, have depended
on such political circumstances as the state of presidential-Senate
relations, Presidents' and Senators' other priorities, and ambitions
for the federal office being filled. Thus, Presidents have been disposed to be guided by grander rather than baser political concerns,
such as objective merit, commitment to a particular constitutional
philosophy or vision, or the long term relationship between the
state and federal governments or among federal institutions.
Within this set of grander concerns, Gerhardt tells us that
Presidents have been guided by pragmatic concerns such as ease of
confirmation, popularity, party loyalty, and the need to appease
certain constituencies. 7 Therefore, in contrast to scholars that view
presidential power as having and carefully using chits or as a conflict between public interests and the need for private political gain,
Gerhardt emphasizes that long and short term and grand and baser
concerns are not necessarily in conflict. Thus, simple definitions of
vote and/or strategic political optimization by Presidents will not
explain the process of choice. Only by the analysis of political
context can data be provided about which concerns and the relationship among concerns come to the fore in specific appointment
cases and over time. Moreover, Gerhardt emphasizes the importance of the ability of the President and Senate to frame the debate
over a confirmation, sequence events, and make comparisons
among different confirmation battles.38
Another important insight by Gerhardt about the inside view
involves his questioning whether scholars should emphasize the
personal nature of the confirmation process. Scholars who emphasize a President's close ties to a candidate or measure presidential
performance in terms of personal qualities such as intelligence,
popularity, charisma, strength of character or conviction, loyalty,
stubbornness, ambition, or political acuity will not get at the historically contingent and institutional or structural factors that inform
presidential appointments. 9 Gerhardt also does not advocate personalization of the appointment process through the application of
game theory, which evaluates strategies used by candidates and

37. See id. at 1378.
38. See id. at 1381.
39. See Gerhardt, supra note 24, at 1372-74.
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Presidents in terms of "games of chicken" to get the votes required
for confirmation. The problem with game theory is that the
appointment process is too complex to fit the construction of a
single game, especially in light of the role of a multi-membered
Senate in the process40 Most important, personalizing the system
of appointments does not allow one to explain historical patterns of
presidential and senatorial decisions. Presidents who manage institutions in different historical periods are subject to different social,
political, and historical events or developments. Non-personal criteria for evaluating presidential performance for Gerhardt include the
following: "intelligence, popularity, charisma, strength of character4
or conviction, loyalty, stubborness, ambition, or political acuity." '
Presidents' short- and long-term objectives have institutional
ramifications for marshalling resources of their institutions to ensure "successful blending." Gerhardt concludes, "The measure of a
President's performance is largely based on how well he has managed-or has marshalled the powers of his office to control-the
particular combinations of challenges confronting him in the course
of trying to achieve certain long- and short-range objectives. 42
Thus, the relationship of appointments to a President's broader
legislative agenda and to the long term direction of governmental
power and authority is key to Gerhardt. Following Skowronek's
important insights on Presidential power and its evaluation, Gerhardt emphasizes that success of a President must be evaluated in
terms of his effect on constitutional change-not simply the percentage and absolute numbers of successful nominees. Gerhardt
emphasizes that "institutional organization or support or associating
a nominee with some potential danger to the public or something
problematic with the President constitutes the strongest trigger for
mobilizing public support for or against a nomination. ' 43 Therefore, as the importance of a nominee to the President's vision for
change increases, so too do the costs of supporting or opposing a
nomination, thus adding to Senate-Presidential conflict and greater
chances for the failure to nominate. If this is so, then at the core
of presidential power and the appointment process is not the specific skills of the President or nominee or their political philoso-

40.
41.
42.
43.

See id. at 1376-79.
Id. at 1374.
Id. at 1378.
Id. at 1396 (citing previously STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLmcs PRESIDENTS
MAKE: FROM JOHN ADAMS TO GEORGE BUSH 28 (1993).).
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phies, but rather how senators and the opposition view what is at
stake to the President in terms of their policy and political objectives in a particular historical context. Gerhardt notes, "It is possible to identify different levels of Presidents' success depending on
the breadth of their vision or the scope of their ambition for the
nation (and subsequent success in fulfilling it). . . . Indeed, if
success was measured strictly in terms of the percentages of a
President's confirmed nominations, the figures would be misleading.""
Thus, the analysis in Gerhardt's contribution to this Symposium is an inside, not an outside view of the presidency and political change. We see important insights on how the evaluation of
presidential success and failure must be made in terms of the difficulty and importance of a President's policy objectives-and their
relationship to a restructuring of government. Gerhardt's major
contribution is to extend Skowronek's insights on the analysis of
presidential power and its evaluation to the appointments process
viewed from the inside.
V. POLITICAL CoNFLICT, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY,

AND SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS

Jeffrey Tulis asks us to think more systemically about presidential and senatorial power over the process of appointment to the
Supreme Court. His primary concern is about what he views as the
constitutional abdication by the Senate to the President on Supreme
Court appointments, an abdication that results in the failure of the
appointment process to provide our nation with the opportunity to
deliberate about the nature of our constitutional regime today in
light of the past and our nation's future needs. Tulis argues that
the health of our nation will be improved if the Senate would not
abdicate to the President its role. Deliberation and accountability
will secure debate and decisions about which standards of evaluation are needed for a Presidential nomine to the Supreme Court are
appropriate at a given point in the history of our nation.
Tulis argues that when comparing the Supreme Court appointment process in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there is an

44. Gerhardt, supra note 24, at 1380. Therefore, the relationship of appointments to
policy objectives is central. For example, Gerhardt reports that Eisenhower's attempt to
constrain legislative expansion of the New Deal succeeded for a short time, but the cost
of that objective was his failure to reshape the federal judiciary. See id. at 1389.
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"altered relationship" between the President and Congress, one that
constitutes a "remarkable institutional rupture in American political
development."'4 Supreme Court nominations in the nineteenth century "were a frequent occasion for conflict between the executive
and legislature over the composition of the Court, the power of
competing partisan objectives, and the character of the constitutional order."' In the nineteenth century only one in three presidential
nominees made it to the Supreme Court; in the twentieth century
only one in ten presidential nominees did not make it. Tulis abhors
the fact that the Senate has rubber stamped most presidential
choices for the Supreme Court because opportunities are lost for
deep discussion on constitutional questions. For Tulis the appointment process becomes a "useful window on the changed character of our constitutional order, on the transformation of separation of powers in institutional politics over the course of two centuries."' Tulis prefers the nineteenth century approach because
"institutional politics were agnostic, constitutional perspectives were
contestable, partisans were institutionally loyal, arguments were
rhetorically sophisticated, and inter-branch conflict was relatively
symmetrical. In short, the nineteenth century national public arena
appears highly politicized."' Tulis criticizes the present century:
[The Senate has been] deferential to the President on Court
appointments, indeed supinely deferential. The Senate (and
President) appear bereft of a constitutional understanding of
their roles. Partisans are increasingly disloyal to their institution. The political relation of President and Senate is
politically asymmetrical. In short, the twentieth century
national public arena is, in many important ways, markedly
apolitical.49
Thus, while Gerhardt seeks to explore the presidential appointment
process to explain the changing nature of presidential power,
Tulis's objective is to look at the Supreme Court nomination and
confirmation process as a window into important changes in the
quality of our constitutional regime, with particular regard to

45. Jeffrey K. Tulis, Constitutional Abdication: The Senate, The President, and Appointments to the Supreme Court, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1331, 1331 (1997).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1332.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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whether deliberation about that regime occurs. The scholarly objectives of both Gerhardt and Tulis are not to engage in a narrow
debate, as that between unitarians and anti-unitarians over whether
"the text and structure of the Constitution as originally understood
created a strongly unitarian executive branch," or whether "changed
circumstances of today make the unitary executive more necessary
now than ever before," or "whether normatively a strongly unitary
executive is a good thing."'5 Tulis, in analyzing the Supreme
Court nomination process, is "less concerned with explaining the
causes of this alteration of American politics than with diagnosing
its character, to understand its meaning, and to articulate its
significance."' His goal is to explain the politics of Supreme
Court appointments, with a concern for the effects on the quality
of deliberation and communication that informs and is informed by
citizens and opinion leaders in the nation. Tulis's aim is to use this
case study to explore the nature of institutional change historically
in the American regime, not to explain the causes of the change.
Tulis views his objectives as not primarily to explore what he sees
as a "decayed constitutional order."52 Rather, he seeks to
document the decline in conflict over the Supreme Court
appointments process and to understand the causes and institutional
effects of such a decline. Tulis's analysis supports the notion that
our nation is becoming unitary in terms of presidential power over
appointments to the Supreme Court, both as an empirical
phenomenon and against the wishes of the Founders. Tulis does
address the question as to "whether normatively a strongly unitary
executive is a good thing," and answers no, primarily because a
unitary presidency in the Supreme Court appointment process undermines deliberative democracy. However, his argument is not
primarily directed at the legalist debate about "the text and structure of the Constitution as originally understood created a strongly
unitarian executive branch," or whether "changed circumstances of
today make the unitary executive more necessary now than ever
'
before."53
Tulis's arguments about the need for a stronger senatorial
presence and robust debate in the Supreme Court appointments
process are based on a rejection of the neo-Wilsonian theory of

50.
51.
52.
53.

Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 1, at 1461.
Tulis, supra note 45, at 1332.
Id. at 1334.
Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 1, at 1461.
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separation of powers, which viewed American politics as too
conflictual, especially as compared to British politics. Tulis views
conflict as good and its decline as hurtful to the American regime.
Tulis views more open conflict as helping in the production of
Supreme Court Justices of stature to the Court. For Tulis, the problem with the present confirmation process is not the presence of
political conflict, but that it is "conflict conducted under the auspices of a regime of deference;" in the nineteenth century "conflict
legitimately induced and self-consciously nurtured" a more substantive appointments process.5 4
According to Tulis, a politics of conflict, rather than deference, would create an arena "in which the criteria of choice themselves can be responsibly established" rather than one in which a
specific value or objective imposed on the process by a scholar
from without will occur.55 Therefore, for Tulis, an appointments
process that will produce excellent Justices cannot be oriented to
maximize one virtue or a hierarchy of qualifications-such as those
defined' by scholars, many of whom see political conflict as a
negative which keeps us from securing on the Supreme Court
Justices who fit the characteristic defined by scholars not the people. For Tulis, the qualities sought in a Justice at a specific time
should be defined in terms of a consideration of the specific makeup of the Court in light of thoughts about what new directions in
constitutional law are required of the nation-as defined by the
process of deliberation at the time of appointment. Tulis wishes to
bring "balance" to "a body [the Supreme Court] whose collective
capacities and qualities are themselves the subjects of continuous
'
Thus for Tulis, the confirmation process
political dispute."56
should create the standards of evaluation at a specific point in
history and ensure a debate about who best can fit those values.
There are to be no litmus tests of qualities and political values for
Court nominees which are to come from outside the conflictual
political process he desires. The American Bar Association, legalist
scholars' definitions of judicial competence, notions of apolitical
judging, or the objective of securing the best person in terms of
individual qualities should not alone or even primarily determine
the standards for evaluating Supreme Court appointees.

54. Tulis, supra note 45, at 1336.
55. Id. at 1338.
56. Id. at 1337.
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At the core of Tulis's model is a deep trust of the political
system. If allowed to be truly conflictual, the quality of debates
and deliberation will improve and the nation will be reeducated on
the problems facing our nation and the role of the Court and Congress in meeting those problems. Tulis sees the confirmation process as a "fit occasion for the polity as a whole to revisit the
terms of its composition-the most basic, politically constitutive
questions."5 7 The confirmation process is a "periodic political
reeducation." Under this view, the Thomas and Bork hearings
served the positive purpose of providing for robust discussion
rather than the usual politics of deference to the President in
appointments to the Court-a deference that robs our constitutional
system of an important period of rethinking central questions of the
regime and problems facing the nation.
In support of the anti-unitarian position, Tulis reads the
debates at the Constitutional Convention as highlighting a concern
by the Founders that conflict, not deference, between Senate and
President should be the rule. "The structural properties of the
Presidency (principally his singularity) would ensure that a debate
would occur, that choices would be made. The structural properties
of the Senate (principally its plurality) would ensure that the choice
that was made occurred after public debate." ' The choice of
Supreme Court Justices is political. The debate in the Senate
extends the range of considerations about the choice.
Tulis argues that because twentieth century debate is limited,
in most cases to legal competence, moral turpitude, and financial
improprieties or conflicts of interest, the debate does not get to
larger questions of constitutional discourse and separation of powers. In modem confirmation processes opposition to a candidate
takes the form of personal moral qualities and conflicts of interest-not larger issues of constitutional discourse. Instead of talking
about a candidate's approach to constitutional interpretation, we
talk about conflict of interests, as in the Haynesworth nomination.
Political conflict is personal-not about directions our constitutional
regime should take. For Tulis, "the politics of deference reversed
the logic of constitutional discourse."59 The Bork nomination is

57. Id. at 1338.
58. Id. at 1341.
59. Tulis, supra note 45, at 1345.
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the exception to the politics of deference that proves Tulis's rule
on how the confirmation process should operate.
Tulis likes the Bork nomination because it involved "explicit
and profound conflicts over interpretative posture, doctrinal understanding, and ideological presupposition" rather than discussion of
ethics and competence.' It was about Bork's writings and views
on the Constitution. Tulis does not like the fact that scholars such
as Stephen Carter want to avoid similar confrontations in the future, because the most talented men and women will not allow
themselves to be placed in nomination.6'
The problem is that we have lost our political culture of conflict in favor of a politics of deference; in so doing we have either
stopped conflict over constitutional questions and issues of change
or have covered over real conflict on questions of constitutional
interpretation and institutional role by over-emphasizing nominee
competence and morality.
Jeffrey Tulis offers an original and forceful argument that
opposes the conventional wisdom of many scholars who oppose a
robust politics of Supreme Court appointments. At the core of
Tulis's argument is a faith in conflict as central to greater deliberation about big issues of constitutional law, theory, and change.
However, there is little argument about why we should have faith
in more robust, conflictual politics as a good. The Founders were
not so whetted to open conflict as indicated by the fact that the
selection of the Senate was not to be as democratic as that of the
House. The debate in the Senate was expected to be less prone to
the negatives of "faction" than in the House where the smaller
constituencies might produce Federalist 10 problems. What does it
mean to say the Senate and the President "appear bereft of a
constitutional understanding of their roles," or that "partisans are
increasingly disloyal to their institutions," or "the political relation
of President and Senate is politically asymmetrical" or "the
twentieth century national public arena is, in many important ways,
markedly apolitical?"62
For Tulis, there is conflict today, but it is "conflict conducted
under the auspices of a regime of deference" which is unlike the
conflict "legitimately induced and self-consciously nurtured," as he

60. Id. at 1353.
61. See id. at 1356.
62. Id. at 1332.
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sees in the nineteenth century. 3 Therefore, it is the debate about
individuals rather than larger questions of rights and political system principles that bothers Tulis. Debate should be about the past
and future constitutional order, not individual Court nominee foibles. The nomination process is "a fit occasion for the polity as a
whole to revisit the terms of its composition-the most basic politically constitutive questions. . . . The purpose of the selection process extends beyond the selection itself to the polity's need for
periodic political reeducation."' Tulis foists upon the selection
process the remediation of the separation of powers system itself.
He writes, "A deep defect in the separation of powers system is
the lack of institutional support for the kind of constitutional education necessary for its best functioning."" Therefore the selection
of the Justice is to do more than choose a Justice of ability, or to
choose a Justice who will vote on constitutional questions in one
way or the other; it is to rethink basic questions of institutional
design-to rethink the balances of power under separation of powers.
It is not clear this was the will of the Framers; nor is it clear
such an objective is possible in a choice of a Justice. I can see
how the standards for evaluation can be part of the political process at a point in time-but that is far different from the idea that
the selection process should be a point of total reeducation on the
structural bases of our constitutional system. I can see one making
the more general argument for a new constitutional convention
which would think fundamentally about our constitutional system.
It is not clear that Supreme Court selection is the proper or best
forum for such a debate.
It is clear that Tulis is not for a unitary presidency, at least
with regard to the selection of Supreme Court Justices. It is also
clear that Senate and wider public deliberation about the nature of
our regime, and the Court make-up, is what Tulis desires. However, how are we to square this longing for thinking about big questions of constitutional regime with the equally important value that
the Court must be counter-majoritarian when fundamental rights
and polity principles are questioned? It is true that Senate advice
and consent is indicative that the presidency was not to be uni-

63. Id. at 1336.
64. Tulis, supra note 45, at 1338.
65. Id.
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tary-at least with the nature of individuals (and policy concerns)
that were to be placed on the Supreme Court. It is also clear that
there is much evidence that counters Tulis's view of the glory days
of the nineteenth century during which important issues of constitutional regime were discussed.'
If one asks why the Framers chose not to trust the House of
Representatives with the power of advice and consent for Supreme
Court nominees, one gets a different picture of the degree of robustness of debate (and democratic quality) than they expected in
the confirmation process. According to Tulis, the President's nomination would ensure a nomination and debate and the plurality of
the Senate would ensure a public debate. 7 The process would
ensure that there would not be the selection of a simple "partisan"
of the administration. "The Senate is an indispensable locus of
deliberation and choice, not an appendage to a presidential 'regime."" Senate participation is to limit simple partisanship in
Supreme Court selection. The key problem in the twentieth century
is the deference to the President and the Senate's failure to raise
large constitutional issues. Rejection is now based on legal competence, moral turpitude, and financial improprieties, rather than the
"basis of their constitutional views," writes Tulis, "One must find
an interest to serve as an excuse for a reason!"69
Tulis views Bork's selection process as raising high-minded
constitutional questions. One may ask whether the Bork nomination
highlighted important constitutional questions, as opposed to issues
of how specific cases might be decided given the parity among
conservatives and liberal/moderates on the Supreme Court. At one
point Tulis admits that high-minded institutional regime questions
were not central to many Court nominations in the nineteenth
century. Tulis quotes Henry Monaghan's view that the Senate rejected or tabled Supreme Court nominations for virtually every
conceivable reason, "including the nominee's political views, political opposition to the incumbent President, senatorial courtesy, and
on occasion even a nominee's failure to meet minimum professional standards."7' The evidence that Tulis himself draws upon sug-

66. See, e.g., LAURENCE TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT (1985).
67. See Tulis, supra note 45, at 1343.
68. Id. at 1341.
69. Id. at 1343.
70. Id. at 1354 (quoting Henry Paul Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or
Politics? 101 HARv. L. REV. 1202, 1202 (1988)).
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gests that the nomination process was never a forum for large
regime questions in our nation's history. If this is so, then his
argument must boil down to a love of political debate (not about
the candidate's personal qualities alone). In this form the argument
sounds less high-minded. Although it does suggest that even this
debate is marginally better than the present debate, these are very
different arguments. One can ask which is more important to
Tulis-real political education or just less personal Court selection
processes. If he wants to make the stronger argument for the selection process as forum for constitutional regime change, he will
have to build this into an argument about originalism and nonoriginalism, both as an interpretive method in general and as an
interpretive approach to separation of powers in particular. A positive (originalist) reading versus a dialectical (non-originalist) reading of the Constitution and separation of powers will produce
answers to the question of the role of the Supreme Court selection
process as varied as those about how to read the Chadha case.7'
The case for selection process as discussion of regime needs a far
firmer (constitutional) theoretical base than is offered in this article.
Moreover, the assumption that the Founders liked more robust
politics and political debate generally, and in the case of the selection process, needs a wider grounding than presented here.
Tulis seems to have a fallback position. He admits that "it
should be clear that not all confimation battles were occasions for
serious debate about the structure of the constitutional order or the
proper principles of constitutional interpretation."' Political consideration such as region, party affiliation, ethnic representation,
and others by both President and Senate did occur in the nineteenth century. However, "constitutive principles," in terms such as
the relationship of national and state government, slavery, and
government control of the economy, did inform such choices.73
The nineteenth century, though not a golden age,
was a political order in which the usual competition for
partisan advantage was marked by the contention of insti-

71. See William Haltom, Separating Powers: Dialectical Sense and Positive Nonsense,
in JUDGING THE CONSITUTION: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON JUDICIAL LAWMAKING (Michael W.

McCann & Gerald L. Houseman eds., 1989) (presenting an excellent analysis as to how
originalist and non-originalist scholars and Justices analyze the issues in the Chadha case
and other recent separation of powers cases).
72. Tulis, supra note 45, at 1351.
73. See id.
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tutions structurally composed to represent different perspectives on democratic choice. It was a political order
whose legislators were more self consciously political, more
aware of the stakes involved in decision, more willing to
contest the choices posed, or to challenge the poses presented. 4
Tulis's original contribution raises the following additional
questions for me, which either he fails to consider or adequately
answer: Does the call for increased constitutional discourse and
reeducation through the appointment process mean that litmus tests
by the President or the Senate on particular constitutional questions
should be applied to nominees? What does Tulis's term "the nature
of constitutional regime" mean in specific terms? What discussions
in past nomination processes would qualify? With what results in
terms of the level of conflict and the constitutional health of the
nation? What would qualify as "reeducation" and robust discourse?
Does discussion about Bork as a key swing vote on the Supreme
Court count? Would Bork's views on constitutional issues and
constitutional interpretation be in order? Is a discussion about abortion rights and rights of defendants-a discussion of constitutional
norms-proper, or must one debate visions of separation of powers
or the role of the Court in our constitutional question? Does the
fact that Justice Kennedy is now in Bork's seat on the Supreme
Court, with key effects on constitutional doctrine, as indicated by
the Casey and Weissman decisions, support the argument for or
against more conflict and robust debate? In what ways?
I have serious questions about whether the call for more democracy and more deliberation regarding big issues in the nomination process, especially with regard to whether robust debate will
make impossible the continuation of the Supreme Court's role as a
protector of minority rights and as the key counter majoritarian
institution in our constitutional structure. What effect will open and
robust debate and possible encouragement of litmus tests have on
pushing the Supreme Court to simply follow the will of the people
and thus undermine key fundamental rights principles in the Constitution and the implied rights later defined by the Supreme Court
as in the Constitution?
Also, if political conflict and reeducation is to be a core value
of the confirmation process-that is, a major rethinking of large

74. Id. at 1353.
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constitutional questions--one can ask what is the role of the
amending process and the Supreme Court as interpreter of the
Constitution? Does the appointments process and Supreme Court as
interpreter of the Constitution play a secondary role to the Supreme
Court as a body which is to follow the will of the people when
this will probably reflects the animus that momentary factions tend
to harbor?
There needs to be integrated into Tulis's analysis a more
filigreed interpretation of the concept of separation of powers and
the specific role of each of the branches in our constitutional system. Did the Founders not seek a filtration process that would
produce the best citizens for public life? Is an open, deep conflict
during each Supreme Court appointment (and perhaps all major
appointments) commensurate with getting the best person for the
job or for ensuring that the will of the people in elections will be
registered on the Supreme Court? As I indicated above, if the
Supreme Court is to be counter majoritarian, why should we allow
the choice of Justices to be a "majoritarian" process?
Is it necessarily bad for our constitutional system that the
process of deference to Presidents and less conflict in the twentieth
century has produced more moderate Court choices by conservative
Presidents and more liberal or moderate court choices by liberal
Presidents? Might not such results help sustain the rule of law and
the autonomy of law as separate from everyday politics? Is that not
a positive outcome? Would a nomination process that featured a
politics of conflict negate that possibility? Might not more open
conflict produce less thoughtful Justices? We need a much fuller
discussion of what "constitutional discourse" is about. Will more
discourse make it easier or harder for a President to place the
views of his supporters into the decisions of the Court?
Are open conflict and the politics of deference the only two
alternatives? Is there a possibility for something in between? Why
so much faith in conflict? Tulis wants to link Court choices to
wider changes in regime, such as a debate about Reagan's attack
on big government in light of the administrative state. If Justices
are chosen with this concern in mind, will we not get more backward looking Justices on the Court and a reproduction of the
Lochner era? Finally, Tulis rejects the notion that a re-politicized
process will produce mediocre Justices or choices by the most
gifted possible nominees to decide not to enter the fray. Is the
evidence so clear on this score?
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Tulis's paper is more successful as a call for more deliberation
than it is for a call for more conflict. Tulis has identified a problem-the decline of deliberative democracy-as have many contemporary scholars of American political and legal institutions, and of
the role of law and politics. He is less persuasive when claiming
that more conflict necessarily produces better deliberation or that
the appointments process should be the central forum to achieve
more deliberation in our constitutional regime, for reasons he and
other scholars have identified in their analysis of the history of
appointments. Nor is the evidence persuasive that a more
conflictual appointment process results in a more informed Court.
I prefer the constitutive nature of Tulis's view of the confirmation process: let's study politics to see what we get in terms of
Justices and standards of evaluation for Justices as opposed to
looking at such questions as whether externally applied X and Y
objectives for a good justice are met by the process of appointment. However, the assumption that politics and conflict will lead
to more or better deliberation, without a consideration of the drawbacks with regard to values of our constitutional regime, leads to
serious questions as to whether the Court can continue to be counter-majoritarian under such a system.
Politics for Tulis is about discussion of standards of evaluation,
not about good and bad men. Therefore, we should not focus on
the personal qualities of candidates. Why can't we focus on both
and let empirical/historical analysis answer these questions? Tulis
argues that the choice of Justices is politically contestable and that
it is a fit occasion for the polity as a whole to revisit the terms of
its composition-that is, its most basic constitutive question. What
constitutes debating the terms of the composition of the polity
needs to be more fully explored. Did the Thomas nomination allow
a full discussion of the composition of the polity? Did it allow a
full discussion of sexism and sexual harassment? Did it educate?
To what degree did the debate help or hinder our understating of
issues of race and gender?
Ascertaining the role of the Court is a key problem. To know
standards for evaluation of the confirmation process we need to
know Tulis's concept of the Supreme Court in our political legal
system. We get little of this. Tulis presents a general argument for
more conflict and debate about the nature of the regime. Yet, does
more conflict allow the Court to protect rights and be countermajoritarian more effectively? The conclusion that the political
system should set standards of evaluation for Supreme Court Justic-
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es in light of Court make-up and doctrine assumes that there are
not a larger set of norms for a good Court (such as being countermajoritarian and protecting rights). This larger set of norms-other
than more debate about constitutional questions and reeducation of
the populace-is needed as a problematic counter to the notion that
more conflict is good.
In order to discover what is good or bad about the Bork nomination, we need to compare it to other open debates regarding
Court make-up and regime. We need to test historically whether
conflict has been good and bad compared to other regime
needs-not just consider pluses and minuses as to good and bad
Justices on standards we know little about.
For example, does conflict during the Supreme Court appointment process produce Justices of better quality? Does it produce a
Supreme Court that is more or less independent of politics? What
does a comparison among the confirmation processes (including
their levels of conflict) prior to, during, and after the period of
selection of Lochner era Justices tell us about the relationship of
level of conflict and the degree to which Justices are out of touch
with society when they get on the Court? Does more conflict and
less deference of the Senate to the President in the appointments
process lead the Supreme Court to be behind or in front of political institutions as forums of political change?
The value of more constitutional discourse, like the value of
more deliberation as a good in itself, is too general as a standard
of evaluation compared with the deeper notion of the role of the
Court as counter-majoritarian. Does conflict produce real discussion
about constitutional values? Cannot conflict produce good and bad
results? How does the argument for more conflict and more deliberation relate to Theodore Lowi's duopoly argument? Does duopoly
leads to more or less conflict over Supreme Court appointees? For
starters, did duopoly lead to the rejection of Bork, the appointment
of Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer? What do these
selections tell us about conflict, the need for deliberation, quality
of Justices, etc.?
To get at these questions we must move from the level of a
general argument for conflict and deliberation to a structural analysis about political institutions, history, and change-a form of
analysis to which Theodore Lowi has dedicated his life-whose
core values or premises might be applied to a reconceived legalist
study of the presidency, presidential power, appointments, and
regime change.
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VI. CONTEXT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

Theodore Lowi has been a pioneer of what Gerhardt has called
the outside view of American political and legal institutions.
Lowi's The End of Liberalism' is an exquisite examination of
"external forces (i.e., the social, political, economic, and historical
developments or influences originating from outside the formal or
'
constitutional structure)."76
For Lowi, these external forces
changed our public philosophy from capitalism to pluralism to
interest group liberalism, and resulted in political and legal system
changes, many of which were pathological to basic constitutional
principles. In The Personal President: Power Invested, Promise
Unfulfilled,7' Lowi again explores American political institutions,
in this case the presidency, using both inside and outside
approaches. Lowi explains why as Presidents and the government
gained more power and responsibilities the presidency became
weaker. In The End of the Republican Era,78 Lowi has a more
modest objective. Rather than a full inside and outside analysis of
the overall political system or a part of it, Lowi seeks to identify
the changes in public philosophies that have triggered the end of
the Republic era that replaced Liberalism, but has not yet created a
new definition of regime. One can also see inside and outside
views on political institutions and change in his superb book on
political change in New York.79
Lowi's contribution to this Symposium argues that originalism
can never replace the effects of history and changing institutions in
the analysis of presidential power. For Lowi separation of powers
was saved by changes in the party system-the replacement of
King Caucus with the convention as the presidential nominating
system and the replacement of the probability of ultimate House
election of the President with the undermining of the electoral
college itself by the simple practice of pledging electors. Lowi
writes, "These two developments took presidential politics completely outside of Congress and gave the presidency a popular base
totally and completely independent of Congress. In the process the

75. THEODORE Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969).
76. See Gerhardt, supra note 24, at 1365-66 (defining the "outside" view).
77. THEODORE Lowi, THE PERSONAL PRESIDENT: POWER INVESTED, PROMISE
UNFULFILLED (19xx).
78. See THEODORE Lowi, THE END OF THE REPUBLICAN ERA (1995).
79. See THEODORE Lowi, AT THE PLEASURE OF THE MAYOR: PATRONAGE AND POWER
IN NEW YORK CITY, 1898-1958 (1964).
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Separation of Powers was saved by the very same institution reviled by virtually every framer, including Madison."" ° That is,
separation of powers was strengthened by its relationship to a twoparty system. Lowi concludes, "[Tihe parties were not following
any intent of the Framers. The presidency has simply strengthened
in relation to Congress as a coincidental and accidental consequence of winning elections."'"
Moreover, our nation moved from Congress being a dominant
neo-Wilsonian institution in the nineteenth and early twentieth
century to a Presidential-centered administrative state due to the
Roosevelt revolution. For Lowi, the late twentieth century is not
simply a period of divided government, it is a duopoly. Duopoly is
"Absolute Separation of Powers".-.a situation of separate and
independent branches." 2 Ironically, this is what Lowi envisions
that the Framers wanted; for Lowi, it is unfortunate that we have
to live with this pathological condition of government-that is,
government without innovation, politics, robust, or meaningful
debate. Dual party government with each party nested in and
dominating one of the branches--duopoly government-is antiinnovation and enamored by cost/benefit analysis rather than
political debate about the important issues that face our nation. It
is a government in which each major party is happy with control
of a piece of the action.
Here and in all of Lowi's scholarship, improving both deliberative democracy and the accountability to citizens have been primary objectives. Also, Lowi has sought changes in political structures,
procedures, and governing ideas to enhance deliberation and accountability. 3 What is more, lurking behind these institutional
concerns is a fervent belief in legal principles such as equal protection of the law and the separation between law and politics under
the umbrella of a rule of law. Lowi's support of deliberative democracy and his lack of fear of conflict join Jeffrey Tulis and
Theodore Lowi in their scholarly concerns and their evaluation of
American political institutions. However, Theodore Lowi has not

80. Theodore J. Lowi, President v. Congress: What the Two-Party Duopoly Has Done
to the American Separation of Powers, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1219, 1222-23 (1997).
81. Id. at 1223.
82. Id. at 1224.
83. One only has to explore his call for "juridical democracy" in THE END OF LIBERALISM, to see an argument for reform which is to deal with the pathologies of interest
group liberalism. See Lowi, supra note 75, at 294-313.
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only demonstrated his support for improving the quality of public
deliberation and accountability and for the role of political conflict
in securing these improvements. Unlike Tulis, Lowi has provided
quite textured analyses of the effects of history, political institutions, and social and economic factors on the level of political
conflict and quality of our nation's political deliberations. Lowi
also began long ago the important task of providing an interpretation of how outside forces have influenced the inside workings of
government. However, Lowi's vision of duopoly and its affect on
separation of powers needs greater clarification of the relationship
among outside (societal) and inside (government) factors as causes
of the pathologies in government that he has identified in his keynote paper.

VII. GOING FURTHER OUTSIDE: STUDYING POLITICAL AND
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS UNDER NEW HISTORICAL
INSTITUTIONAL PREMISES

To help in the production of a more fully textured analysis of
how government institutions resonate with social, political, and
ideational changes in our nation, I want to introduce another layer
of outside forces and scholarly problematics that none of the participants in the Symposium have explored. How can we understand
more fully the relationship among institutions and between institutions and society? How can we explain persistence and change in
political and legal institutions in a polity that is thickly populated
with such institutions? Stephen Skowronek argues that in any complex society each institution is likely to have its own history. Thus,
change in one institution is unlikely to run parallel to change in
another, even though change in one institution may effect changes
in others. Many different rules of legitimate action and many different systems of meaning will be operative in a polity at any
moment. It is nearly impossible to synchronize the institutions of a
polity to produce one coherent over-arching system because it
would entail at the very least creating and recreating all institutions
simultaneously. Thus, a genuinely institutional view of politics will
adopt a multiple orders thesis. Its premise would be that any given
polity is likely to be composed of very different and simultaneously operating institutional systems. The wellspring of change,
Skowronek argues, would be the juxtapositions of these orders.84

84. See Stephen Skowronek, Order and Change, 28 POLITY 91-96 (1995).
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In this introduction to new historical institutional analysis I ask
that we think about the Supreme Court as an institution compared
to the presidency and other institutions. Skowronek's vision of the
historical institutionalism means that we can study the Supreme
Court or any other institution, but we must be respectful of the
different systems of meaning in the different institutions. We also
must be mindful of whether a particular institution has a role in
changing the meanings of other institutions. Do other institutions
give the Supreme Court the legitimacy to declare what the Constitution means? If the Supreme Court's power is not seen as legitimate by another institution, what does this mean about the role of
the Supreme Court in the American polity? Which order among the
multiple orders has legitimacy? How does this inform a comparison
of courts and elected bodies? Does this mean that there is a hierarchy of institutional orders? What role does the Constitution and the
Supreme Court as its most legitimate final interpreter (other then
through Amendment) play in a hierarchy of orders? Does the Constitution and the Court set boundaries on the orders of other institutions? What are the limits of this power?
This concept of multiple orders is key. It might work as a
basis for comparison among institutions as well as between them.
For example, in some doctrinal areas the Court might not be so
different from an adjudicatory agency in a bureaucracy, such as in
administrative law. In the areas of equal protection and First
Amendment it will be less like other courts and bureaucracies.
Historical institutionalism might have to be analyzed by groups of
doctrinal areas if change is to be studied. The same is true with
regard to the degree that the Court bases its choices on lower court
or elected body choices.
What does it mean to study the Supreme Court under
Skowronek's vision of historical institutionalism? It means the
following: (1) different rules of order operative at any moment in a
given polity are likely to grate against each another; (2) we need
to study how ingrained and sustained asymmetries inform the construction of civic power; (3) in a historical institutional view, institutional politics is most significant when viewed as the arena in
which different rules of legitimate order converge, collide, and fold
back on one another. Skowronek writes: "Far from homeostatic, the
picture of politics that emerges here is kinetic, featuring a stubbornly tenacious intercurrence of different standards of legitimate
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action." 5 It is not accidental that among the examples of persistent incongruities and frictions among institutional ordering are "the
incorporation in the Constitution of protection for the institution of
slavery with a regime of individual rights," "the promulgation of
the regime of individual rights in the context of the primordial
norms of the patriarchal family," and "the emergence of a national
economy based on the corporate organization of capitalism within
the context of a decentralized system of economic regulation rooted
in state judiciaries."86 Therefore, the tension between institutional
forms is at the core of change.
The new institutionalism is not the study of system, order, and
regularity. Instrumental approaches to Supreme Court decision-making and doctrinal change are based on such values." They do not
place constitutional change within the context of wider change in
society, and do not identify the institutional and ideational conflicts
that have produced the change. The new institutionalism must
study "institutional intercurrence where the pathways of change are
negotiated in the pushing and hauling of several institutionallygrounded standards of legitimate action.""8 It is significant that
Skowronek uses examples from constitutional law, including: the
incorporation of ancient common law rules of work relations into
the liberal, market oriented competitiveness of post-Revolutionary
era; the incorporation into the Constitution of the protection of
slavery within a regime of individual rights (and I might add the
change in that part of the Constitution); and the promulgation of
the regime of individual rights in the context of the primordial
norms of the patriarchal family.
Historical Institutionalists see the juxtaposition of institutional
orderings as the normal state of affairs. For example, they see
conflicts between a new plebiscitarian presidency forms as layered
over the original constitutional form. Again, constitutional power or
law questions are at the core. Does this mean that there is a special role for the Court in dealing with different forms? In other
words, what is the role and what are the sources of evaluative

85. Id.
86. Id. at 95-96.
87. See RONALD KAHN, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITIrONAL THEORY, 19531993 (1994) (discussing the nature of instrumental analyses of Supreme Court decisionmaking and why they have impaired our understanding of that body and the process of
doctrinal change).
88. Skowronck, supra note 84, at 96.
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criteria in a world of institutional change? Rogers Smith's view of
a liberal teleology of political development in the United States, as
including decidedly non-liberal traditions compared to the more
traditional Hartzian view, suggests that conflict will occur as to
how to define ongoing factors, ideas, and institutions. 9 Also, the
Historical Institutionalists do not see order, change, and time as set
or given. They "problematize the notion of time itself."
A problem arises in conventional scholarship because we think
of institutions as the Supreme Court, the Presidency, and Congress,
not as orders, but as multiple orders. One gets the sense that orders
are separate and distinct to a greater degree than they are. Are all
orders as discrete and insular as is suggested by this language?
Skowronek correctly argues that we need not view the concept of
order as normative. Rather than supporting order as a value, we
need to study the process of change in which order and legitimacy
are part of the problem. This view seems valid to me with regard
to the study of the power of different institutions and in its rejections of the pro-order concept deep within apologetic pluralist
(Robert Dahl and David Truman) thought.
However, historical institutional studies must deal with standards of evaluation as to polity and rights principles in the Constitution up front, not in order to reify one value or the other, but to
study the degree to which constitutional principles inform the process of institutional and policy change, and the nature of what
constitutes "legitimate" action. Skowronek is correct in his call to
get rid of homeostatic understanding of change and development.
We need to replace the homeostatic image with "a picture of institutional intercurrence, where the pathways of change are negotiated
in the pushing and hauling of several institutionally-grounded standards of legitimate action."'" What does he mean by standards of
legitimate action?
We can ask whether class structures appear in intermediate
level institutions, such as the interpretive community. We should
also ask whether the Supreme Court should be viewed as an intermediate institution such as the party system or the structure of
economic interest groups, like unions, that mediate between individual political actors and national political outcomes. Institutional

89. See Rogers Smith, Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions
in America, 87 AM. POL. So. REV. 549 (1993).
90. Skowronek, supra-note 84, at 96.
91. Id. at 95.
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comparison is required. It is clear that the Supreme Court does
decide cases brought by advocates of individuals, groups, and institutions. It makes choices that are binding not only on the individual or groups who are before the Court, but in a special way in
which legal theory, process, and grounds of legitimacy are
emphasized. We can ask what is and is not special about the
Supreme Court.
Historical Institutionalists seek to study how wider economic,
political, and social changes inform the actions and role of an
institution within the wider political system and how that wider
system informs the impact of an institution on society. In addition
to establishing methods of analysis that "explain" doctrinal change
at the opinion level, we need to build out from this and study
change in the societal role of the Court through measuring external
changes that are made in response to Court cases and actions in
response to cases, which may include the decision not to act, as
Michael McCann has found in his research.' By having a quite
unsubtle view of institutions and individual agency, law, and
change, a Rosenberg type of analysis fails to place the Court in the
historical institutional framework.93 The scholar will have to be
sensitive to the difference between changes in society caused by
direct political processes like labor politics, by class and the social
economic structure, and by doctrinal change. With regard to
explaining change due to constitutional principles and doctrine, we
are helped at one level because the products of the Supreme Court
are written down, as doctrine. However, the way Court cases
change the political and legal culture, and how citizens are to view
each other and the government as a result of the cases, is not
written down; rather is played out in actions-and inactions-as
McCann has so artfully demonstrated. Yet, we need to see the
impact of Court cases on law, other institutional actions, and on
actions taken and not taken by elected and appointed public officials and by those in the private sector. In doing so, if we were to
be tied to behavioral rather than interpretive methods of analysis, it
would undermine the subtlety of analysis.
Since institutions are viewed as patterned relations, we ask how
political institutions are structured. How do institutions constrain

92. See Michael W. McCann, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE
POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 227-77 (1994).
93. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
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and refract politics-realizing they are not the only cause of
change? With regard to the Supreme Court, since institutions structure political interactions, we likewise consider how the Court as
an institution structures its choice system-what will be the role of
the Supreme Court and the role of law as institutions structure
legal interactions and in this way affect political-legal outcomes in
cases. Yet it does so in a way that is not the same as by
bureaucrats or by elected officials, such as the President. Thus, the
study of presidential power and the presidency-as well as the
constituent powers of that office-such as the appointments
process, will have to be conducted in ways that inform how the
appointments process and the presidency affect institutional
orderings and how institutions are affected by wider changes in the
social, economic, and political order outside government.
Scholarship on the presidency, the Supreme Court, and legal and
political change in the future will look very different than the
conventional scholarship of today. The important contributions to
this Symposium of Michael Gerhardt, Jeffrey Tulis, and Theodore
Lowi inform these new directions. However, much more will have
be done to develop the scholarly problematics of the new
Historical Institutionalists and to apply them to the study of
presidential power, the Supreme Court, and the relationship
between law and politics. It is these primary issues that are
explored in this Symposium.

